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N the past several decades there has been increasing public concern for
the quality and preservation of our environment. This concern has led
to the enactment of legislation intended to protect and restore the envi-
ronment, on both the national' and state2 level. In recent years, much
legislation has focused on the problem of waste storage and disposal, re-
flecting the public's increasing awareness of the garbage disposal
problem.'
* J.D. 1991, Fordham University School of Law; A.B. 1981, Lafayette College.
1. See, e.g., Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671 (1988), as
amended by Act of Nov. 15, 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, 42 U.S.C.S. §§ 7401-7671 (Supp.
1991) (control of air pollution); Clean Water Act of 1977, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1988);
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA),
42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-75 (1988) (Superfund - cleanup of hazardous substances); Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-92 (1988) (encouraging
recycling).
2. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 403.702-403.73 (West 1986 & Supp. 1991) (Re-
source Recovery and Management Act); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 116F.01-.30 (West 1987
& Supp. 1992) (recycling solid waste); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 13:1K-6 to -13 (West 1979 &
Supp. 1991) (Environmental Cleanup Responsibility Act); N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW
§§ 8-0101 to 8-0117 (McKinney 1984 & Supp. 1992) (State Environmental Quality Re-
view Act); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §§ 6601-13 (1984 & Supp. 1991) (reducing solid waste
and packaging bans).
3. See, e.g., Little Waste in the Dinkins Trash Plan, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 1991, at
A14 (editorial) (need for new incinerators); Train Bearing Tainted Soil Rolls On, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 24, 1991, at A12 (trainload of contaminated soil seeking disposal site); Wil-
liam E. Schmidt, Soil On Troubled Waters, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29, 1987, at A34 (wander-
ing garbage barge from Islip, New York, symbolizes the urgency of waste disposal
problems); Jaffe, Tons of City Ash Remaining in Limbo on the High Seas, PHILADELPHIA
INQUIRER, Feb. 12, 1988, at BI (discussing two barges of ash from municipal incinera-
tors, at sea with no destination).
The size of the problem can be daunting. Since the early 1970's, discarded materials of
all kinds requiring disposal have risen to the level of five to six billion tons per year and
are increasing at a rate of about eight percent per year. JOHN H. DAVIDSON & ORLANDO
E. DELOGOU, Solid Waste, Sanitary Landfills and Open Dumps, I FED. ENV'T REG.
§ 4.02 at 4-1 (1990). The Freshkills landfill, in Staten Island, New York, alone receives
25,000 tons per day. Illinois Lawmakers Send Groundwater Bill to Governor, Whose Sig-
nature is Expected, 18 Env't Rep. (BNA) 836 (July 17, 1987).
The problem of garbage disposal has been with mankind for centuries. Kim I. Mon-
troll, Solid Waste Source Reduction and the Product Ban: A Commerce Clause Violation?,
13 VT. L. REV. 691, 691 (1989). Monte Testaccio in ancient Rome was a 140 foot high,
1,200 foot wide mound of used clay wine jars. Id. at 691 n.1; MICHAEL GRANT, HIs-
TORY OF ROME 321 (1978). By modern standards, however, Monte Testaccio is a dwarf.
The landfill at Freshkills is expected to be 500 feet high when finished in the year 2000. A
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There are five basic solutions to dealing with solid waste: incineration,
ocean dumping, landfills, recycling, and source reduction. 4 None of
these present a perfect long-term solution to waste disposal.5
Increasingly, states export their waste to other states who have space
in their landfills, as their own domestic disposal sites are filled.' The
states importing the waste are unhappy to receive other states' garbage.
The receiving states foresee their landfills filling sooner than expected
because of such influxes, thereby forcing them to seek new disposal sites.
This creates incentive for prospective receiving states to prevent the extra
hazardous waste landfill in Alabama covers 2,400 acres. James Lyons, The Garbage War
Between the States, FORBES, Oct. 15, 1990, at 92.
4. Montroll, supra note 3, at 692-95.
5. Incineration generates ash which must still be disposed of, Jaffe, supra note 3, and
the construction of incinerators tends to lead to intense local community opposition (the
Not In My Backyard Syndrome - NIMBY). Alfred B. DelBello, The Politics of Garbage:
The Influence of the Political Process on the Construction of a Refuse-to-Energy Plant, 14
COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 357 (1989); Allan R. Gold, New Incinerators Termed Essential in
New York City, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 5, 1991, at Al.
Ocean dumping is no longer viewed as an acceptable alternative because of the harm it
causes to the marine environment. Slope Water Receives Bulk of Sewage Dumping, ON
THE WATER, July/Aug. 1990, at 15 (Cornell Cooperative Extension - Suffolk County
Marine Program 1990); A Summary of Proceedings of the Bi-state Hearing on Environ-
mental Problems in the Metropolitan New York/New Jersey Region 11 (Apr. 8, 1986)
(statement of Mr. Wendell, Interstate Sanitation Commission Counsel) (two billion gal-
lons-of sewage per day are discharged in the area of New York harbor).
Recycling, so far, has been limited to certain materials, mostly newspapers and metals,
which amount to only a small part of a community's daily waste. See, e.g., John Ho-
lusha, All About Making Recycling Pay, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 1991, at 5. Moreover,
recycling plant capacity to date is nowhere near dealing with the volume. Allan R. Gold,
Confronting the Rising Cost of Recycling, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 1990, at Al. In a compre-
hensive study by the state of Washington, it was determined that only about 15% of its
waste is recycled. See Illinois Lawmakers, supra note 3, at 839. The state ecology direc-
tor noted the lack of markets for some recycled goods and also that the cost of recycling
sometimes exceeded the cost of a new item. Id. See also Allan R. Gold, As Trash is
Recycled, Where Can It All Go?, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 1990, at B4. There are also unex-
pected consequences of recycling. Glass to be Recycled Showers Florida Dump, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 12, 1991, at C9 (half of the glass bottles collected are broken in transit and
dumped); Marlise Simons, US. Paper Recycling Hurts Europe's System, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 11, 1990, at A9 (American newspapers, collected and shipped to Europe, have
flooded thie recycling system and have caused a glut).
Landfills have always been the favorite disposal method because of the low cost and
ease involved. Currently, at least 90% of waste is disposed of on land. DAVIDSON &
DELOGOU, supra note 3, at 4-4. However, as the existing landfills fill up, it is becoming
more difficult to locate new sites. Id. Regulations make it harder to keep the ones that
are still open. Robert Pear, U.S. Sets Rules to Cut Landfill Pollution, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
12, 1991, at A18; Town Plans To Add Plastics To Mandatory Recycling List, HAMPTON
CHRONICLE-NEws, Nov. 22, 1990, at 1.
Source reduction is aimed at eliminating some of the waste altogether. This is usually
accomplished through product package bans (i.e., a ban on plastic containers). See, e.g.,
Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456 (1981). This method is of limited
use since at best it reduces the amount of waste and does nothing to dispose of the
remainder.
6. Allan R. Gold, Vote in Senate Alarms Exporters of Garbage, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
19, 1990, at B3. New Jersey ships 55% of its garbage to other states. New York ships
11%. Id.
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waste from entering.7
But when a state attempts to take some action that may burden inter-
state movement, the state must consider whether its action is prohibited
by the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution.8
If the state act hinders the movement of interstate commerce, then the
act will be found impermissible. 9 This simple maxim fails to explain the
factors and considerations which courts weigh in determining the consti-
tutionality of a state's action. ' Nor does it mention exceptions to the
Commerce Clause that have been created.1
This Article will explore the role that the Commerce Clause plays in
interstate waste disposal.' 2 It will focus in particular on the "Dormant"
Commerce Clause and its most consuming exception - that for the "mar-
ket participant." Part I examines the Commerce Clause in light of the
Framers' intent and its history. Part II covers the market participant
exception. Part III briefly looks at the clause's application to waste dis-
posal. Part IV examines how courts and legislatures have applied the
market participant exception to interstate waste cases. Finally, this Arti-
7. Id. Jeff Bailey, Toxic Waste Sparks War Between States, WALL ST. J., Aug. 16,
1991, at B1; Steven L. Myers, New Jersey and Indiana Act on Trash, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
19, 1991, at BI.
8. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3. "Congress shall have the [p]ower... [t]o regulate
[c]ommerce with foreign [n]ations, and among the several [sltates, and with the Indian
[t]ribes .... "
9. See, e.g., City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978); Baldwin v.
G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511 (1935); Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761
(1945). See generally 1 RONALD D. ROTUNDA ET AL., TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 11.1 (4th ed. 1986). [Hereinafter ROTUNDA];
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2d ed. 1988) [Hereinafter
TRIBE]; GEOFFREY R. STONE, ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1986).
10. See infra notes 67-87 and accompanying text.
11. One example is the exception invoking the exercise of a state's police power. Hu-
ron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960) (upholding a city smoke
ordinance that affected ships in interstate commerce on the grounds that the city was
entitled to protect the health of its citizens).
Another example is the market participant exception. See infra notes 88-109 and ac-
companying text; Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, Inc., 447 U.S. 429 (1980).
12. Solid waste is defined in RCRA in part as:
any garbage, refuse, sludge from a waste treatment plant, . . . and other dis-
carded material, including solid, liquid, semisolid or contained gaseous material
resulting from industrial, commercial, ... operations, and from community
activities ....
42 U.S.C. § 6903(27) (1988).
Waste, for the purposes of this Article, means nonhazardous garbage. Hazardous
waste has been excluded since the disposal of toxic substances is heavily regulated by
federal statutes. See, e.g., CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671 (1988); RCRA, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 6901-92 (1988). Where hazardous waste cases have been cited it is for the general
Commerce Clause principles involved.
Nuclear waste has been totally excluded from discussion because nuclear power and
waste, both civilian and military, have been pre-empted by federal legislation. Also, de-
spite nearly five decades of atomic power, the federal government has yet to determine
how to dispose of nuclear waste. William J. Broad, A Mountain of Trouble, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 18, 1990, § 6 (Magazine), at 37.
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cle concludes that the exception is overwhelming the rule and that such a
result is contrary to the intent of the Commerce Clause. Therefore, some
modifications to the market participant exception are suggested.
I. THE COMMERCE CLAUSE
Unlike much of the Constitution, 13 the Commerce Clause14 is an af-
firmative grant of power to Congress. It is not, however, an exclusive
grant of power to Congress, but rather one that is shared with the
states.' 5 Under the clause, Congress has the authority to take such ac-
tion as it deems necessary to affect the nation's interstate commerce. 16
The Commerce Clause also acts as a limiting factor on state power since
what Congress regulates, the states cannot regulate. This limit is en-
forced through the Supremacy Clause. 7
More difficult than the affirmative aspect of the Commerce Clause is
the problem of when Congress does not act to regulate interstate com-
merce. The courts then are faced with the task of interpreting the intent
of Congress' silence.'" It is the recognition of the fact that Congress has
the power to regulate commerce but need not take any action to do so
that led to the emergence of the Dormant Commerce Clause.' 9
The Dormant Commerce Clause is essentially an acknowledgment by
the courts that some aspects of interstate commerce are properly within
the jurisdiction of Congress, even though Congress has not yet acted or
spoken.2" It was first developed by the Supreme Court in 182921 as a
means of checking the power of the states to burden interstate com-
13. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an estab-
lishment of religion .... ").
14. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 ("The Congress shall have [p]ower... [t]o
regulate [c]ommerce ....").
15. In Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824), Chief Justice Marshall noted
that some commerce "would be beyond the power of Congress to regulate." Id. at 194.
16. The Commerce Clause also gives Congress similar authority when dealing with
trade with foreign nations and with Native Americans. This Article will examine only
the interstate applications of the clause.
See also DAVID W. BROWN, THE COMMERCIAL POWER OF CONGRESS (1910); E.
PARMALEE PRENTICE & JOHN G. EGAN, THE COMMERCE CLAUSE OF THE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTION (reprint 1981) (1898).
17. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. ("This Constitution, and the [laws of the United States
... shall be the supreme [l]aw of the [1]and .... ").
18. Gibbons, 22 U.S. 1; ROTUNDA, supra note 9, §§ 11.1-.2.
19. At least one commentator has suggested that the term "Dormant Commerce
Clause" is inaccurate since "what remains dormant is Congress, and not the Commerce
Clause." Julian N. Eule, Laying the Dormant Commerce Clause to Rest, 91 YALE L.J.
425, 425 n.l (1982).
20. See generally ROTUNDA, supra note 9, § 11.1, at 577-79.
Not all commentators, however, agree that the Dormant Commerce Clause is a consti-
tutionally valid power. Martin H. Redish & Shane V. Nugent, The Dormant Commerce
Clause and the Constitutional Balance of Federalism, 1987 DUKE L.J. 569, 571 (1987)
(arguing that the Constitution provides no textual or non-textual support for the Dor-
mant Commerce Clause).
21. Willson v. Black-bird Creek Marsh Co., 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245 (1829). The state's
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22 * 23merce and has been implemented countless times since.
A. The Early Years
In the early Commerce Clause cases, the Court was concerned with
preserving the newly constructed federal state . 4 The failure of the Arti-
cles of Confederation has been blamed on the divisive trade wars engaged
in by the newly-established states.25 So long as states could interfere with
commerce, it was felt that the country would never be truly unified and
there would always be the danger of it splintering apart. 26 The Balkani-
zation of the nation's economy was and is something the Court has ac-
tively opposed.27 As long as state governments pursued their separate
interests at the expense of the nation through discriminatory and protec-
tive measures, the country could not prosper.2 8
This view reflects what the Court perceives to be the original intent of
the Constitution's Framers 9.2  Though it has been suggested that the
act was not "repugnant to the power to regulate commerce in its dormant state." Id. at
252.
22. Richard H. Seamon, Note, The Market Participant Test in Dormant Commerce
Clause Analysis - Protecting Protectionism?, 1985 DUKE L.J. 697, 699-700 nn. 15-18
(1985).
23. See H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525 (1949); City of Philadel-
phia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978); Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511
(1935). The Court has, however, recently referred to it as the "'negative' aspect of the
Commerce Clause." See also New Energy Co. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 273 (1988).
24. See, e.g., Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824) (attempt by New York to
create a monopoly on interstate ferry service in New York Harbor); Willson v. Black-bird
Creek Marsh Co., 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245 (1829) (erection of a dam that blocked a navigable
waterway); Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 54 U.S. (13 How.) 518
(1852) (erection of a bridge over a river blocking boat traffic); Cooley v. Board of War-
dens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1852) (local ordinance requiring all vessels entering port to
use a local pilot).
25. THE FEDERALIST No. 42, at 275 (James Madison) (Paul L. Ford ed., 1898)
("[t]he defect of power in the existing Confederacy to regulate the commerce between its
several members"). See also TRIBE, supra note 9, § 6-3, at 404; PRENTICE & EGAN, supra
note 16, at 1.
26. THE FEDERALIST NO. 7, at 36 (Alexander Hamilton) (Paul L. Ford ed., 1898).
"The competitions of commerce would be another fruitful source of contention .... Each
state ... would pursue a system of commercial policy, peculiar to itself. This would
occasion distinctions, preferences and exclusions, which would beget discontent." Id.
27. Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979). The original purpose of the Com-
merce Clause was "to avoid the tendencies toward economic Balkanization that had
plagued relations among the [c]olonies and later among the [s]tates under the Articles of
Confederation." Id. at 325-26. See also ROTUNDA, supra note 9, § 11.1.
28. THE FEDERALIST No. 11, at 69 (Alexander Hamilton) (Paul L. Ford ed., 1898)
("[a]n unrestrained intercourse between the [s]tates themselves will advance the trade of
each").
29. See Donald H. Regan, The Supreme Court and State Protectionism: Making Sense
of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1091, 1092 (1986); Baldwin v.
G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511 (1935). Justice Cardozo stated "a chief occasion for the
Commerce Clause was the 'mutual jealousies and aggressions of the [s]tates, taking form
in customs barriers and other economic retaliations.'" Id. at 522 (quoting 2 FARRAND,
RECORD OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 308 n.29). Cardozo was echoing the opinion of
a long series of Court decisions.
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Framers, as men of property, were more interested in preserving their
wealth than in any ideals,3" it cannot be doubted that they also had the
intellect to foresee the benefits of a central government with strong pow-
ers. As Alexander Hamilton wrote, "[t]he importance of the Union, in a
commercial light, is one of those points about which there is the least
room to entertain a difference of opinion . "..."31
In the pre-Civil War cases, the Court usually deferred to Congress'
decisions regarding commerce.32 On the few occasions when the Court
did consider the Commerce Clause, the issue invariably involved an overt
attempt by a state to directly affect interstate commerce. 3 In Gibbons v.
Ogden,34 Chief Justice Marshall broadly defined commerce as "inter-
course"35 and noted that such trade in any form affected every state.36
He interpreted the Commerce Clause as invalidating any action by a
state which hindered this commerce. However, Marshall did recognize
that there are some areas that are better left to the states themselves. He
believed that the exclusively internal commerce of a "[s]tate would be
beyond the power of Congress to regulate. 37
The Court acknowledged a further exception to this principle, called
the state's "police power," in cases where the state legislated to protect
the health, welfare and morals of its citizens.3" "[T]he role of each state
as 'guardian and trustee for its people' ,39 has been an accepted justifica-
tion for state burdens on interstate commerce. 4°
30. DAVID W. BROWN, THE COMMERCIAL POWER OF CONGRESS, at vii-viii (1910);
CHARLES BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION (1961). But
see ROBERT E. BROWN, CHARLES BEARD AND THE CONSTITUTION, A CRITICAL ANAL-
YSIS OF "An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution" (1956).
31. THE FEDERALIST No. 11, at 69 (Alexander Hamilton) (Paul L. Ford ed., 1898).
32. TRIBE, supra note 9, § 5-4, at 306. This is in part because Congress passed little
commercial legislation during the period. No federal commercial legislation was found
invalid prior to the Civil War. In fact, only two pieces of federal legislation were found
unconstitutional during this period: the Judiciary Act, Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1
Cranch) 137 (1803) and the Missouri Compromise, Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19
How.) 393 (1857). See also ROTUNDA, supra note 9, § 4.4, at 266.
33. See Seamon, supra note 22.
34. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
35. Id. at 189. Marshall was not the first to so define commerce. See THE FEDERAL-
IST No. 11, at 69 (Alexander Hamilton) (Paul L. Ford ed., 1898), which defines com-
merce as "[a]n unrestrained intercourse between the [s]tates themselves ... by an
interchange of their respective productions."
36. Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 194.
37. Id. at 194-95.
38. Michael E. Smith, State Discrimination Against Interstate Commerce, 74 CAL. L.
REV. 1203, 1210 (1986).
39. Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 438 (1980) (quoting Atkins v. Kansas, 191
U.S. 207, 222-23 (1903)).
40. See, e.g., Willson v. Black-bird Creek Marsh Co., 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245 (1829). A
state-approved dam, erected to contain the health dangers of a marsh, was allowed
although it blocked navigation by ships.
In more recent times, the Court has upheld the application of city air pollution ordi-
nances to ships engaged in interstate shipping. Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of
Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960).
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Marshall described "[i]nspection laws, quarantine laws, [and] health
laws" as being in that "mass of legislation" that the states had not sur-
rendered to the federal government. 41 State inspection laws for out-of-
state goods are within the state police power when reasonable,4" unless
in-state goods are excluded from inspection.43 Should in-state goods be
exempt, however, the state is deemed to be engaging in discriminatory
practices. Under Marshall's view, the state laws were valid under its po-
lice powers and not from any inherent state commerce power. 44
The Court went one step further in 1852 in strengthening the power of
the states. In Cooley v. Board of Port Wardens,45 a Pennsylvania law
requiring all ships in state waters to engage a state-approved pilot was
upheld. While the state law undoubtedly burdened interstate commerce,
the Court concluded that the burden was indirect. The regulation in-
volved concerned only a matter of "peculiarly local" concern and did not
call for Congress to pass a uniform "national" law.46
The result of this holding was that, in some cases involving peculiarly
local concerns, the states could concurrently exercise power over com-
merce provided Congress had not yet done so. Subjects requiring uni-
form national regulation could be regulated only by Congress while
subjects of local concern might be regulated to some extent by the states.
This is despite the fact that the local concern may be clearly within Con-
gress' power, like the Pennsylvania pilot law in Cooley. Whether a given
subject was considered appropriate for state regulation often depended
on how the state proposed to regulate it. The critical question concerns
the nature of the state's action, not the subject of its action. The impact
of a state regulation was analyzed by classifying its burden on commerce
as "direct" or "indirect. 47
The Court's willingness to recognize the possibility of state regulatory
powers concurrent with Congress' may be viewed in light of the politics
of the time. The states, especially those in the South, were concerned
with checking federal power, a concern that was realized a decade later
in the Civil War. Within the Supreme Court itself, John Marshall had
died and had been replaced by Roger Taney, an ardent supporter of
states' rights. Taney viewed the Commerce Clause more leniently than
Marshall.48 He believed that it "had no implicit power to invalidate state
41. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 203 (1824).
42. Savage v. Jones, 225 U.S. 501 (1912).
43. Voight v. Wright, 141 U.S. 62 (1891).
44. See ROTUNDA, supra note 9, § 11.2, at 581-82. "Historically Congress has acqui-
esced in state enforcement of Quarantine Laws .... In quarantine cases, the controlling
principle is whether the state police power has been exercised to exclude any object 'be-
yond what is necessary for any proper quarantine.'" Id. at 582 n.8 (citations omitted).
45. 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851).
46. Id. at 319. Because every harbor is unique, each has different local safety con-
cerns and thus requires different qualifications for pilots. A uniform national standard is
therefore inappropriate. See id.
47. TRIBE, supra note 9, § 6-4, at 408.
48. In fact Taney never used the Commerce Clause to invalidate state legislation.
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law" but could only preempt such laws as conflicted with valid acts of
Congress.49
B. The Modern Era
The Cooley doctrine lasted for the next eighty years. Regardless of the
changes and turmoil the country underwent, the distinction between na-
tional and local concerns persisted in interstate commerce.
But the doctrine was not without its critics. They argued that the lo-
cal/national division with its test of direct and indirect burdens was no
longer appropriate in light of the structure of the national economy. In a
land linked and crisscrossed by a vast system of transcontinental rail-
roads and highways, it was hard to argue that a state act would not have
some impact in other states.
In DiSanto v. Pennsylvania,5° Justice Stone wrote a dissent in which he
urged the Court to adopt a more modern and appropriate standard in
order "to prevent discrimination" in "the free flow of commerce."', He
sought a more realistic method, instead of the direct or indirect test,
which he described as "too mechanical, too uncertain in its application,
and too remote from actualities, to be of value."52 Though the Court did
not adopt Stone's proposal, it did begin to inch away from rigid adher-
ence to the direct/indirect test.53
The beginning of the end for the test occurred when the Supreme
Court decided the case Baldwin v. G.A.F Seelig, Inc.54 New York had
adopted a pricing system that served to restrict the sale of milk by requir-
ing milk originating out-of-state to be sold at artificially high prices. In a
unanimous decision by Justice Cardozo, the Court invalidated the state
law. Legitimate state power to regulate commerce for health and safety
reasons could not be invoked to justify discriminatory state protectionist
acts. The Court rejected New York's attempts to allude to a distinction
between direct and indirect burdens:
New York has no power to project its legislation into Vermont by reg-
ulating the price to be paid in that state for milk .... Such a power...
will set a barrier to traffic between one state and another as effective as
if customs duties ... had been laid .... Nice distinctions have been
made at times between direct and indirect burdens. They are irrele-
vant when the avowed purpose of the obstruction, as well as its ...
tendency, is to suppress.., the consequences of competition between
ROTUNDA, supra note 9, § 4.4, at 270 n.21. See also ROBERT G. MCCLOSKEY, THE
AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 88 (1960).
49. Seamon, supra note 22, at 697, 699-700 n.15.
50. 273 U.S. 34 (1927) (holding invalid a state law requiring sellers of steamship tick-
ets to be licensed) (Stone, J., dissenting).
51. Id. at 43-44.
52. Id. at 44.
53. One commentator has described the cases of this period as paying only "lip ser-
vice" to the test. Regan, supra note 29, at 1094.
54. 294 U.S. 511 (1935).
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the states.55
Baldwin is now regarded as the beginning of the "modem era" where the
burden test is discarded, 6 though it was not recognized as such then. In
fact it would be another decade before the Supreme Court would for-
mally abandon the test.
The movement away from the burdens test and towards Justice Stone's
balancing test continued with an article written by Professor Noel Dow-
ling.5" In his article, Professor Dowling began with Justice Stone's dis-
sent in DiSanto and expanded upon it. He concluded that for each case
the Court needed to deliberately balance the national and local interests
involved and decide which of the two interests should prevail. 59
Under this new theory, the Court had to consider all the facts and
circumstances of a challenged regulation and its potential effects and
then weigh the competing national and local interests. If the regulation
interfered with interstate commerce, then it would be invalidated by the
Court. If the regulation fell short of interference, then it would survive.
The key to Dowling's theory was that Congress' regulation would be
conclusive. Congress could always approve of a Court's decision by do-
ing nothing, or it could subsequently enact legislation authorizing and
resurrecting the state law. 6°
In 1945, the Court had the opportunity to finally renounce the burdens
test and adopt Professor Dowling's theory. Southern Pacific Co. v. Ari-
zona 61 involved an Arizona law limiting the length of trains operating in
the state to a maximum of fourteen passenger or seventy freight cars.
The Arizona law impacted most rail traffic between El Paso and Los
Angeles. 62 Applying the new balancing test, the Supreme Court con-
cluded that the state's interest in train safety was more than outweighed
by the nation's interest in an efficient interstate rail system.63 The Court
also noted the lack of evidence justifying the state's conclusion that the
55. Id. at 521-22. See also Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324 (1989) (Court con-
demned attempt by Connecticut to project its beer prices across state lines).
56. See ROTUNDA, supra note 9, § 11.8, at 601; cf Regan, supra note 29, at 1093-94
n.5.
57. Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945). However, certain tax applica-
tions lasted longer. Michelin Tire Co. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276 (1976).
58. Noel T. Dowling, Interstate Commerce and State Power, 27 VA. L. REV. 1 (1940).
59. Id. at 21.
60. Id. at 20. See, e.g., In re Rahrer, 140 U.S. 545 (1891) (upholding the Wilson Act
in which Congress reversed the prior Supreme Court decision Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U.S.
100 (1890)); Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co. (II), 59 U.S. (18 How.) 421
(1856) (decision in Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co. (I), 54 U.S. (13
How.) 518 (1852), finding bridge blocked river navigation, reversed by congressional de-
cision that bridge is an aid to postal service).
61. 325 U.S. 761 (1945).
62. Id. at 774-75.
63. Though the Court did not allude to the Second World War then occurring, it can
be stipulated that it was concerned about the law's impact on the movement of military
material.
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limits would significantly improve safety."4 By rejecting Arizona's asser-
tion that the law was reasonable under its police power,65 "the Court
thus indicated by its language and actions that the test of 'reasonableness'
under the interstate Commerce Clause cases is much stricter than... [in]
due process and equal protection cases." 66
The balancing test in Southern Pacific is still used today. It has been
described variously as a subtle67 and ad-hoc6" balancing of the facts in a
particular case. Though the test has been stated in a variety of ways, the
classic formulation was stated in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc. 69 In voiding
a law requiring cantaloupes grown in-state to be packaged in-state, the
Court, in an oft-quoted passage, said:
the general rule ... can be phrased as ... [w]here the statute regulates
evenhandedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its
effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld
unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in
relation to the putative local benefits. If a legitimate local purpose is
found, then the question becomes one of degree. And... whether it
could be promoted as well with a lesser impact on interstate
activities.70
Essentially, the Court considers a three step process. 7' First, the
Court examines whether the statute has a legitimate purpose.72 Second,
the Court looks to whether a rational relationship exists between the stat-
ute's purpose and the means selected to effect it.73 Finally, the Court
determines whether there are no available alternatives to the regulation
that are less discriminatory.74
Legitimate interests can be separated into two types: non-economic
and economic. Non-economic interests include highway safety, 75 pure
milk,76 clean air,77 clean water,78 and protection of natural resources.79
64. Southern Pac., 325 U.S. at 775-76.
65. Id. at 780-82. Previous state regulations, ostensibly for public safety in interstate
transportation, were usually upheld. ROTUNDA, supra note 9, § 11.7 n.2.
66. ROTUNDA, supra note 9, § 11.7, at 595.
67. Robert Meltz, State Discrimination Against Imported Solid Waste: Constitutional
Roadblocks, 20 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,383 (1990).
68. Earl M. Maltz, How Much Regulation Is Too Much - An Examination of Com-
merce Clause Jurisprudence, 50 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 47, 48 (1981).
69. 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
70. Id. at 142 (citations omitted).
71. Smith, supra note 38, at 1231. See also Note, State Environmental Protection Leg-
islation and the Commerce Clause, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1762 (1974). "Generally, the rule
is that the regulation will be upheld only if it is rationally related to a legitimate state
purpose and the resultant burden on interstate commerce is outweighed by the state inter-
est involved." Id. at 1764.
72. Smith, supra note 38, at 1231.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. South Carolina State Highway Dep't v. Barnwell Brothers, Inc., 303 U.S. 177
(1938); Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949).
76. Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951).
77. Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960).
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Such interests are usually found valid unless they are facially dis-
criminatory.
Economic interests are less certain of being upheld because of the risk
that the regulation will be seen as protectionist. A state may protect
against fraud, s° financial security of its citizens,"1 and preserve the local
economy. 2 Only those types of interests, which afford those within a
state an economic advantage over those outside the state, are consistently
treated as illegitimate. 83
Whether the regulation rationally serves the state interest is usually
relatively easy to demonstrate84 unless the state legislature carelessly
drafted the statute.
The final question is whether less discriminatory alternatives are avail-
able. If so, then the regulation will be struck down.' A statute is dis-
criminatory if it provides a "gain for those within the state ... at the
expense of those without."8 6 A state with a discriminatory statute is ex-
cused only if Congress has consented to the discrimination by passing an
act authorizing it,87 an extremely rare event.
II. THE MARKET PARTICIPANT EXCEPTION
The market participant exception was first articulated by the Supreme
Court in Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp.8 Maryland had imple-
mented a system in which a bounty was paid for abandoned cars brought
78. Procter and Gamble Co. v. City of Chicago, 509 F.2d 69 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
421 U.S. 978 (1975).
79. Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456 (1981).
80.' DiSanto v. Pennsylvania, 273 U.S. 34 (1927).
81. City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978) (avoiding the expense of
new landfills).
82. Lewis v. BT Inv. Managers, Inc., 447 U.S. 27 (1980).
83. Smith, supra note 38, at 1234. See Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511,
522, 527 (1935); Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 162 (1941).
84. Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979). If a regulation seems to move towards
its stated goal, courts hesitate to second guess the legislature, even if it seems unlikely the
regulation will accomplish that goal by itself. Procter and Gamble Co. v. Chicago, 509
F.2d 69, 76 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 978 (1975). An equal protection case, Rail-
way Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949), takes a similar stand. "It is no
requirement ... that all evils of the same genus be eradicated .... " Id. at 110.
85. Hughes, 441 U.S. at 336. See also Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S.
349, 354 (1951); Baldwin, 294 U.S. at 524.
86. South Carolina State Highway Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., Inc., 303 U.S. 177, 184
n.2 (1938). For other definitions, see Smith, supra note 38, at 1213, and Regan, supra
note 29, at 1094-95.
87. See Prudential Insurance Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408, 434-36 (1946); Allan R.
Gold, Vote in Senate Alarms Exporters of Garbage, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 1990, at B3
(proposed legislation permitting states to ban imports of garbage); Curbs on Interstate
Garbage Die in Talks on Capitol Hill, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 1990, at A28) (the Senate bill
permitting states to ban imports of garbage died in House-Senate conference). But see
Hellerstein, Hughes v. Oklahoma: The Court, the Commerce Clause, and State Control of
Natural Resources, 1979 Sup. CT. REV. 51, 54-55 (1979) (noting a congressional statute
authorizing exactly the type of state law that the Court struck down).
88. 426 U.S. 794 (1976). Contra American Yearbook Co. v. Askew, 339 F. Supp. 719
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into the state for reprocessing. The state legislature realized that it was
paying to clean up other states' highways and therefore changed the
bounty system to subject out-of-state reprocessors to more stringent doc-
umentation requirements. The change was challenged by the out-of-state
reprocessors as a state act that discriminated against interstate
commerce.
The Supreme Court upheld the regulations finding that the state was
not burdening or discriminating as a state actor. It rejected the argument
that the state had "interfered with the natural functioning of the inter-
state market."89 Rather, Maryland had "entered into the market itself to
bid up their price."' °
Reeves, Inc. v. Stake9 1 followed shortly after. There the Court held
that South Dakota could refuse to sell cement from a state-owned plant
to out-of-state buyers during a shortage. The state preference for its resi-
dents was held immune from Commerce Clause scrutiny. Because the
state funded, owned and operated the plant, the Court concluded that
South Dakota was a participant in the interstate cement market. 92 As
such it was not acting as a state regulator, but rather as a private party,
who was free to sell to whomever it wanted.
The Court distinguished cement from natural resources93 such as coal,
minerals, wild game, and timber. It noted that cement was "the end
product of a complex process whereby a costly physical plant and human
labor act on raw materials." 94 The distinction was necessary since the
Court had struck down previous state attempts to hoard privately owned
natural resources95 and to prefer state citizens in their consumption. 96
If a state is allowed to regulate a product it owns, how far down the
"stream of commerce" can the state regulation reach? In South-Central
Timber Development, Inc. v. Wunnicke, 97 the Court invalidated an Alas-
kan law requiring that any purchases of state-owned timber be processed
in-state before being shipped out-of-state. There was no majority opinion
(M.D. Fla.), summarily aff'd, 409 U.S. 904 (1972) (a prior affirmation distinguishing a
state's purchases for its own use).
89. Hughes, 426 U.S. at 806.
90. Id. Justice Stevens, in his concurrence, was more pragmatic when he noted that
Maryland had created the market through its subsidies and that the resulting commerce
would not exist otherwise. Id. at 815.
91. 447 U.S. 429 (1980).
92. Id. at 440.
93. Id. at 443.
94. Id. at 444.
95. See City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978) (landfills); West v.
Kansas Natural Gas Co., 221 U.S. 229 (1911) (natural gas).
96. Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553, 598-600 (1923) (distributors to favor
citizens during gas shortages); Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518 (1978). "In a related
context.., state ownership of a natural resource does not immunize its regulation of that
resource from scrutiny under the [P]rivileges and [TImmunities [C]lause." Carol A. For-
tine, Note, The Commerce Clause and Federalism: Implications for State Control of Natu-
ral Resources, 50 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 601, 603 n.9 (1982).
97. 467 U.S. 82 (1984).
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on the question of whether Alaska was a market participant. In a plural-
ity opinion, Justice White reasoned that the state was a participant in the
timber market, but the conditions imposed went beyond what Reeves had
endorsed in allowing a state to choose with whom to deal. The state was
"attempting to govern the private, separate economic relationships of its
trading partners." 98 The state was not allowed to qualify for the market
participant exception to immunize its downstream regulation. 9
The threshold determination is whether a challenged state action is of
the regulatory kind that the Commerce Clause is concerned with or
whether it was " 'market participation' by the state and thus beyond the
reach of the clause."" The "test centers on the form rather than on the
intent or effect of the state action." 10'
The distinction 0 2 between a market participant 0 3 and a market regu-
lator"° had been criticized as having no support in the Commerce Clause
or its underlying purposes. 05 The exception laid out in Reeves, and de-
veloped in later cases," ° makes it easy for a state to avoid Commerce
Clause scrutiny and favor its own citizens through the use of government
enterprises. As will be seen in Part IV, the exception is becoming the
rule.
Considering the uneven distribution of natural resources among the
various states, such distinctions are inadvisable.' The Court is inviting
confusion since there is no clear definition of a natural resource'08 or
when it becomes an end-product.' 0 9
98. Id. at 99.
99. Id. See also United Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Mayor of Camden, 465
U.S. 208 (1984). But see White v. Massachusetts Council of Constr. Employers, 460 U.S.
204 (1983).
100. Seamon, supra note 22, at 705.
101. Id.
102. See supra notes 91-92, 97-99 and accompanying text.
103. A state is a market participant when action by the state resembles that of a private
trader.
104. A state is a market regulator where the state attempts to control a market to gain
an advantage for itself.
105. Note, supra note 96, at 618. See also Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S.
794, 818-820 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 449-50
(1980) (Powell, J., dissenting).
106. E.g., South-Central Timber Development v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82 (1984); White
v. Massachusetts Council of Constr. Employers, 460 U.S. 204 (1983); Hughes, 426 U.S.
794. In all of the preceding cases except Wunnicke, the Supreme Court upheld state
activity that otherwise would have been struck down as discriminatory under the Com-
merce Clause.
107. The stronger a state's share, the more the "terms" of its contracts resemble regu-
lations. Conversely, the weaker its share, the less regulatory a state's contract terms ap-
pear. See STONE, supra note 9, at 327-28.
108. Compare County Comm'rs of Charles County v. Stevens, 473 A.2d 12 (Md. 1984)
(landfill not a natural resource) with Swin Resource Systems, Inc. v.. Lycoming County,
883 F.2d 245, 251-54 (3d Cir. 1989) (difficulty in defining a natural resource evident from
the courts discussion whether a landfill is a natural resource), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1127
(1990).
109. How much human labor is necessary to become an end-product? Coal and natu-
14 FORDHAM ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REPORT [Vol. III
III. WASTE AND THE COMMERCE CLAUSE: CITY OF PHILADELPHIA
V. NEW JERSEY
City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey "10 has proven to be the touchstone
Supreme Court decision on the Commerce Clause and out-of-state waste.
The New Jersey legislature, in an effort to preserve its dwindling landfill
space for its own citizens, passed a statute prohibiting the importation of
most solid or liquid waste,"' which originated or was collected outside
the state. When challenged by private landfill operators and the cities
with whom they had disposal agreements, the New Jersey Supreme
Court held the law valid under the Commerce Clause."
2
In a seven to two decision, the United States Supreme Court reversed.
It held that the statute fell "squarely within the area that the Commerce
Clause puts off limits to state regulation. '"" 3 The state had slowed "the
flow of commerce for protectionist reasons . . ." and attempted to "iso-
late itself from a problem common to many by erecting a barrier" to
interstate commerce.' '
4
New Jersey had argued that waste had no value and so could not be
used in trade.' As support for this, New Jersey pointed to the state's
police power to prohibit items which by their very nature were dangerous
to humans." 6 The Supreme Court rejected this argument noting that
"all objects of interstate trade merit Commerce Clause protection."'" 7
The Court distinguished the quarantine cases, on which New Jersey
relied, as involving articles whose "very movement risked contagion." '' 8
The waste involved here represented no danger while it was being moved
and any harm that did arise would occur after disposal in a landfill. At
that point, the waste was indistinguishable from New Jersey generated
waste.'" ' While New Jersey could conserve landfill space by reducing the
waste flow through bans, it could not discriminate based on the waste's
origin. ' 20 The Court did recognize that it was possible that a state might
ral gas have to be mined and pumped before they can be used, timber becomes lumber,
and water may be purified before drinking; yet, all have essentially the same characteris-
tics afterwards as when they started. Justice Powell noted this problem in his dissent in
Reeves when he wrote that the Court's definition of a "complex [physical] process" would
cover most economic activity. 447 U.S. at 448-49 n.2 (Powell, J., dissenting).
110. 437 U.S. 617 (1978).
111. The exceptions were largely limited to materials being recycled. Id. at 619 n.2.
112. Hackensack Meadowlands Dev. Comm'n v. Municipal Sanitary Landfill Auth.,
348 A.2d 505 (N.J. 1974), rev'd sub nom, Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617
(1978).
113. Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 628.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 621-22.
116. Id. at 622. See also supra notes 38-44 and accompanying text.
117. Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 622.
118. Id. at 628-29.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 626-27. Because the state regulation affected all landfills, publicly and pri-
vately owned, the market participant exception was not an issue. Id. at 627 n.6.
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be able to ban waste from only state funded landfills. However, because
the state regulation involved here affected all landfills, publicly and pri-
vately owned, the market participant exception was not an issue.' 2' Pro-
phetically, Justice Stewart reminded New Jersey that the same
Commerce Clause that permits other states to send their waste for dispo-
sal would "protect New Jersey in the future" if it should decide to export
waste. '
22
IV. WASTE AND THE MARKET PARTICIPANT EXCEPTION
The cases after Philadelphia applied its holding in a straightforward
manner and struck down bans on the import of out-of-jurisdiction
waste.1 23 These cases all found Philadelphia controlling in rejecting ar-
guments that the bans were necessary to protect public health and ex-
isting landfill space because there were less discriminatory means
available.' 24 They stand for the general rule that a state can freely limit
or curtail the amount of waste entering its landfills, but in the process, it
cannot discriminate against out-of-state waste purely on the basis of
origin. ,25
In the mid-1980's, a new generation of cases began to emerge. Unlike
the earlier cases, which had involved broad state or local regulations that
banned out-of-state waste from all disposal sites within the jurisdic-
tion,126 the new cases involved bans that were limited in application.
Typically, the ban would apply only to disposal sites owned by the regu-
lating government entity rather than to all sites within the jurisdiction. 27
121. Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 627 n.6. "We express no opinion about New Jersey's
power, consistent with the Commerce Clause, to restrict to state residents access to state-
owned resources .. " Id. (citations omitted). This language has been seized upon by
some states as permitting discriminatory waste bans when limited to state-owned
landfills.
122. Id. at 629. See Gold, supra note 6; Alan D. Levine, Note, Solving New Jersey's
Solid Waste Problem Constitutionally - or - Filling the Great Silences With Garbage, 32
RUTGERS L. REV. 741 (1979) (predicting retaliation by other states to New Jersey's ef-
forts to ban garbage).
123. Browning-Ferris, Inc. v. Anne Arundel County, 438 A.2d 269 (Md. 1981);
Shayne Bros., Inc. v. Prince George's County, 556 F. Supp. 182 (D. Md. 1983); Dutchess
Sanitation Servs., Inc. v. Town of Plattekill, 417 N.E.2d 74 (1980). But see Monroe-
Livingston Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Town of Caledonia, 417 N.E.2d 78 (N.Y. 1980). The
court upheld a similar ordinance to that of Plattekill because the plaintiff failed to show
that it accepted out-of-state waste.
124. See supra notes 85-87, 120 and accompanying text.
125. Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 626-27. The application of this rule has not been limited
to nonhazardous waste but has been applied to low level nuclear waste as well. Washing-
ton State Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Spellman, 684 F.2d 627 (9th Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 461 U.S. 913 (1983); Illinois v. General Elec. Co., 683 F.2d 206 (7th Cir. 1982),
cert. denied, 461 U.S. 913 (1983).
126. See, e.g., Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 621 (holding unconstitutional New Jersey stat-
ute banning out-of-state waste).
127. A representative statute is Michigan Compiled Laws Annotated § 299.413a,
which banned all out-of-county waste. "A person shall not accept for disposal solid
waste or municipal solid waste incinerator ash that is not generated in the county in
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By limiting the restrictions only to government-owned disposal sites,
the municipalities argued that the market participant exception should
apply. The governments contended that, as participants in the landfill
market, they could decide whose waste to accept.
In County Commissioners of Charles County v. Stevens,12 a ban limit-
ing the use of a county-owned landfill to county residents was upheld.
The court found that the county was entitled to market participant im-
munity because the ban merely limited the benefits of the landfill to the
county taxpayers who had paid for it. 129 The decision noted that the ban
did not restrict the disposal of waste collected outside the county. 3 ' The
court did not deem the complete lack of private landfills important since
anyone who wished to enter the landfill market in competition was free
to do so.13'
Citing Stevens, a federal court reached a similar decision the same year
in Shayne Brothers, Inc. v. District of Columbia. 32 Here the District op-
erated several landfills, some of which were actually outside of the Dis-
trict's boundaries, and banned waste collected elsewhere.1 33 The court
had no trouble finding market participation,1 34 even in the case of the
landfills outside the District's boundaries. There, the District enjoyed no
special powers and was only another private landfill operator.135
In another case, Harvey & Harvey, Inc. v. Delaware Solid Waste Au-
thority,136 a court upheld an out-of-state waste ban by distinguishing
Philadelphia.13 7 The court said Philadelphia stood for the rule that a
state could not gain benefits at the expense of those out-of-state.13 8 Here
it concluded that the aim was not to gain benefits but purportedly to
protect health and the environment,1 39 the very two arguments that New
Jersey had made and lost."4 Questionably, the court concluded that the
state act had only "incidental impact on commerce between the
states."
1 41
In Evergreen Waste Systems, Inc. v. Metropolitan Service District,42 a
three county solid waste planning district banned waste generated
which the disposal area is located unless [the county so authorizes]." MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 299.413a (West 1984 & Supp. 1991).
128. 473 A.2d 12 (Md. 1984).
129. Id. at 19-21.
130. Id. at 19, 20.
131. Id. at 19.
132. 592 F. Supp. 1128 (D.D.C. 1984).
133. Id. at 1130.
134. Id. at 1133-34.
135. Id.
136. 600 F. Supp. 1369 (D. Del. 1985).
137. 437 U.S. 617 (1978).
138. Harvey, 600 F. Supp. at 1380.
139. Id.
140. See supra notes 115-120 and accompanying text.
141. Harvey, 600 F. Supp. at 1380.
142. 820 F.2d 1482 (9th Cir. 1987).
1991] WASTE DISPOSAL AND THE COMMERCE CLAUSE 17
outside the district from the district landfill.'43 In upholding the prohibi-
tion, the court found that the ban "applie[d] to only one of Oregon's
many landfills' and that it affected waste from most other counties
within the state as well as waste from out-of-state.14 Using a balancing
test, it concluded that the ordinance regulated evenhandedly and treated
out-of-state waste the same as most in-state waste. 146 Also, the prohibi-
tion placed only an incidental burden on interstate commerce since other
landfills were available in Washington and Oregon. 147
The Service District's act of banning non-local waste is distinguishable
from the market participant exception. As a market participant, a gov-
ernment entity like the District of Columbia in Shayne Brothers 148 and
South Dakota in Reeves, 149 is free to choose with whom it will trade or
contract. The Evergreen ban typifies the local waste ban. The locality
bans non-local waste from only a small percentage of the state's landfills
overall, leaving the rest available for waste regardless of source. 50
The Evergreen rationale, however, has been criticized.' By using a
rational basis balancing test instead of the strict scrutiny standard, the
court permitted a facially discriminatory statute to stand.'5 2 The poten-
tial threat to interstate commerce that the ruling presented has been
noted. 53 If every locality in a state passed a similar law, the effect would
be the same as a state ban on out-of-state garbage.
Although the Supreme Court has rendered Evergreen's validity ques-
tionable by striking down instances of intrastate discrimination affecting
interstate trade, 154 other courts continue to follow the Evergreen ration-
ale.'55 If this line of cases continues, then the local waste ban could join
the market participant exception as a way to avoid Commerce Clause
scrutiny.
The most dramatic interpretation of the Commerce Clause exceptions
occurred in LeFrancois v. Rhode Island.56 The state legislature enacted
143. Id. at 1483.
144. Id. at 1484.
145. Id.
146. Evergreen, 820 F.2d at 1484-85.
147. Id. at 1485.
148. Shayne Bros., Inc. v. District of Columbia, 592 F. Supp. 1128, 1133-34 (D.D.C.
1984).
149. Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 440 (1980).
150. Evergreen Waste Systems, 820 F.2d at 1484.
151. Meltz, supra note 67.
152. Id.
153. Exclusion of All Non-Oregon Waste Envisioned, 18 Env't Rep. (BNA) 835 (July
17, 1987) (citing plaintiff's attorney).
154. Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951). United Bldg. & Constr.
Trades Council v. Mayor of Camden, 465 U.S. 208 (1984), reached the same conclusion
under the Privileges and Immunities Clause of U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1.
155. Bill Kettlewell Excavating, Inc. v. Michigan Dep't of Natural Resources, 732 F.
Supp. 761 (E.D. Mich. 1990) (holding an out-of-county waste ban does not overtly dis-
criminate against out-of-state waste), aff'd, 931 F.2d 413 (6th Cir. 1991).
156. 669 F. Supp. 1204 (D.R.I. 1987).
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a law limiting the use of one specified state-owned landfill"' to state-
generated waste only. Significantly, the landfill was the largest landfill
still operating in New England and the only one in Rhode Island that
accepted non-hazardous solid waste.' 58 The result was that Rhode Is-
land had effectively shut out garbage from other states.1 59
Nevertheless, since the statute was limited to only one landfill, the act
would probably have met the Evergreen test for a local use only ban.
However, the court never reached that issue, finding that, as a state-
owned facility, the market participant exception applied.! 6' The court
noted that "in its practical effect" the act was "identical to the New
Jersey statute"' 6' in Philadelphia 162 and, as such, should have been in-
validated. However, applying the law solely to a state-funded landfill
proved a "critical distinction."'' 63 Finally, the court refused to create an
exception to the market participant exception for a "monopoly in landfill
services."'" The court noted that, while the state may own the only
landfill, no mechanism existed to stop anyone else from opening a new
landfill.' 65 Moreover, at least four such landfill applications were then
pending in Rhode Island.'
66
Several principles have emerged from these recent Dormant Com-
merce Clause/solid waste cases. First, the Dormant Commerce Clause
applies equally to efforts by states'6 7 to ban out-of-state waste, as well as
to each state's political subdivisions.' 6 Second, a state can freely ban or
limit waste entering landfills provided no distinction is made based on the
waste's origin.16  Third, the market participant exception permits dis-
criminatory bans, if limited to government-owned or operated land-
fills,' 71 provided private landfills are not barred. '7'
CONCLUSION
In an effort to ban out-of-state garbage from their landfills, states and
their political subdivisions have been seizing the market participant ex-
ception as a loophole to avoid Commerce Clause scrutiny. While the
exception has its merits, the states, through their domination of the land-
fill business, have so abused the exception as to make it meaningless.
157. Id. at 1206.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. LeFrancois, 669 F. Supp. at 1212.
161. Id. at 1208.
162. 437 U.S. 617 (1978).
163. LeFrancois, 669 F. Supp. at 1208.
164. Id. at 1212.
165. Id. at 1211.
166. Id.
167. City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978).
168. Shayne Bros., Inc. v. District of Columbia, 592 F. Supp. 1128 (D.D.C. 1984).
169. See Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 626-27.
170. See supra notes 128-41 and accompanying text.
171. See supra note 165 and accompanying text.
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Since over ninety percent of America's waste goes into landfills,'72 and
over eighty percent of those landfills are government-owned or oper-
ated,173 the exception is quickly becoming the rule.
The market participant theory worked well when applied to a single
cement plant, but when eighty percent of the participants claim that they
are the exception, something is obviously wrong. In light of these statis-
tics and the lower courts' applications of the rule, it is time for the
Supreme Court to revisit the market participant exception.
Some commentators have suggested that the market participant excep-
tion should be eliminated altogether as violative of both the Commerce
Clause and the Privileges and Immunities Clause. 74 Others have said
that the exception should be limited to situations where the state is al-
lowed to discriminate and pursues a minimally burdensome means, 75
quite similar to the rule's current applications.
This author suggests that a middle approach is more desirable. Mar-
ket participation in the waste disposal field should be limited to where
the state is entering the market for its own benefit. The state participant
would have to actually use the waste disposal site itself for its own, state-
generated waste.
Merely owning the site and reserving its use to resident taxpaying citi-
zens should not be enough. A state allowing only taxpayers to use a state
site is not really participating in the market itself. Rather, the state's
invocation of the market participant exception is merely a facade to con-
ceal the state's discriminatory purpose. It is attempting to gain an eco-
nomic advantage for its citizens. This benefit would come at the expense
of other states; exactly what the Framers designed the Commerce Clause
to prevent.
The proposed application would maintain consistency with prior
Supreme Court decisions. In Hughes, 76 the state cleared its own high-
ways. The cement plant in Reeves ' 77 had originally been built to supply
public enterprises, and presumably, continued to do so. At the same
time, it would curtail the trend towards an abusive expansion of the mar-
ket participant exception. This would limit the state to claiming the ex-
ception solely for state-generated waste.
In light of this conclusion that the market participant exception should
172. DAVIDSON & DELOGOU, supra note 3, at 4-3 to 4-4.
173. David Pomper, Comment, Recycling Philadelphia v. New Jersey: The Dormant
Commerce Clause, Post-Industrial "Natural" Resources, and the Solid Waste Crisis, 137
U. PA. L. REV. 1309, 1311 (1989).
174. William A. Campbell, State Ownership of Hazardous Waste Disposal Sites: A
Technique for Excluding Out-of-State Wastes?, 14 ENVTL. L. 177 (1983). But see, Bruce
H. Aber, Note, State Regulation of Out-of-state Garbage Subject to Dormant Commerce
Clause Review and the Market Participant Exception, I FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REP. 99
(1989).
175. Pomper, supra note 173, at 1313.
176. Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 801 (1976).
177. Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 429 (1980).
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be limited in order to maintain national economic harmony, recent Con-
gressional attempts 17 to remove waste regulation from judicial review
are ill-advised. Such action would result in a situation adverse to the
Framers' intent and over two hundred years of constitutional history. To
allow state regulation of interstate waste commerce is to crack open the
door to the dangers of interstate trade reprisals.
178. See, e.g., supra note 87.
